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I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary industrial structure and performance clearly
demonstrate the inherent conflict within laissez-faire economics
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and the free enterprise system.' Driven by the desire to maximize
profits,2 the entrepreneur theoretically will produce the optimal
quantity of goods and services at prices that will maximize con-
sumer welfare, thereby most efficiently allocating the scarce re-
sources society has at its disposal. 3 The economic process therefore
is a dynamic one, with competitive equilibrium achieved only after
intense struggle between competitors. Because birth and death of
business entities are integral parts of the competitive process,' the
economic law of behavior is essentially that of any Darwinian so-
ciety-the survival of the fittest.' Therein lies the inconsistency
between the means and the end of the competitive process. Al-
though unfettered competition most nearly achieves allocative effi-
ciency, it also may produce increasing concentration of economic
power.' The resulting market imperfections in turn produce resource
misallocation and societal welfare loss.' Consequently, to the extent
1. In theory the conflict originated with the classical formulation of free enterprise. See
J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1848); A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
The conflict became a reality with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, and it has become
a dominant theme in the economics of the twentieth century. For a contemporary treatment
of this and related problems in industrial organization, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE (1970).
2. Although some economists have questioned the efficacy of the profit motive as the
driving force of the competitive process, it remains the most acceptable characterization of
the behavioral catalyst within the individual entrepreneur. See generally Gellhorn, An Intro-
duction to Antitrust Economics, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1. A competing theory is the constrained
sales maximization model, the latest version being developed in W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAV-
IOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (rev. ed. 1967).
3. Classical theorists were fascinated with the mystical process by which the "invisible
hand" of capitalism harmonized the efforts of individual entrepreneurs. See SMITH, supra
note 1. More elaborate price theory has since evolved to demystify the workings of the
invisible hand. See, e.g., A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1895); G. STIGLER,
THEORY OF PRICE (1952).
4. Freedom of entry and exit is essential to the maintenance of competitive market
equilibrium. In order to prevent supernormal profit in the long run, firms must be able to
enter an industry quickly when others in the market are earning a profit above the normal
rate of return. The entry of profit-seeking firms, in turn, increases industry supply and hence
drives price back down to the equilibrium level. Conversely, when price falls below the long
run equilibrium point, the least efficient firms will be driven out of the industry. As firms
leave, supply decreases, and prices once again rise to the competitive level. See Gellhorn,
supra note 2, at 15-19.
5. See C. DARwIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1848). For a discussion of Social Darwinism
and its effect on the problem of monopoly, see H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
108-63 (1955).
6. The classical view necessarily produces victors in the competitive process. Scale
economies and market imperfections have combined to prevent the replenishment of compet-
itors, and concentration ratios and profits have risen accordingly. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW COMPETITION (1956); Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American
Manufacturing, 1936-40, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293 (1951). But cf. H. DEMSETZ, THE MARKET CONCEN-
TRATION DOCTRINE (1973) (questioning the earlier industry concentration studies).
7. See Gellhorn, supra note 2; Kamerschen, The Economic Effects of Monopoly: A
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that unfettered competition tends toward concentration of power
and misallocation of resources, the competitive process is self-
destructive, and when monopoly or oligopoly emerge the costs to
society outweigh the benefits.8
Under the direction of the antitrust laws,9 the private plaintiff'"
and the government" share responsibility for controlling the com-
petitive process, but the ultimate determination rests with the
court. Given broad discretion by the original legislation'2 and little
guidance by subsequent enactments,' 3 the federal courts have fash-
ioned a common law of antitrust designed to preserve the otherwise
inherently destructive competitive system." In the development of
antitrust law, no area has produced more disagreement among ju-
rists and commentators than the attempt to monopolize proscrip-
tion of section two of the Sherman Act.'5 While the traditional view
Lawyer's Guide to Antitrust Economics, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1061 (1976). But cf. Boulding,
In Defense of Monopoly, 59 Q.J. EcoN. 524 (1945) (presenting the positive economic effects
of monopoly).
8. Some economists contend, on the other hand, that monopoly produces a net benefit.
See J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934). Schumpeter focuses on
the creative benefits of monopoly and concludes that monopoly may be justified by the added
incentive to innovate. The process by which individual competitors are destroyed is therefore
one of "creative destruction." See also Markham, Market Structure, Business Conduct, and
Innovation, 55 AM. EcoN. REV. 323 (1965).
9. The principal statutes considered here are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970),
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), and Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
10. Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1970).
11. Clayton Act §§ 4A, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15a, 25 (1970); Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. §
4 (1970). Only the government may bring an action to prohibit unfair competition under the
FTC Act. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
12. See Part H(A) infra.
13. Congress has enacted relatively few amendments to the principal antitrust statutes.
The substantive offenses of both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, for example, are identical
to the original version. The only significant alteration was the exception for state fair trade
under § 1, which Congress since has repealed. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (repealing Miller-Tydings and Maguire Acts effective March 11,
1976).
14. A substantial body of opinion contends that economic efficiency is not the only goal
of antitrust. See Part II infra. See generally THORELLI, supra note 5.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides in relevant part: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monop-
olize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony. ... See Blecher, Attempt to Monopolize Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act: 'Dangerous Probability' of Monopolization Within the 'Relevant Mar-
ket,' 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215 (1969); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly
Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373 (1974);
Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize-Specific Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 1121 (1973); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 281 (1956); Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act: Defendant's Market
Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1451 (1973).
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inextricably tying the attempt offense to the completed offense of
monopolization still prevails, divergent but significant plaintiffs'
theories and judicial pronouncements in the lower courts are chal-
lenging that view."1
The first reason for the pending controversy is the difficult
conceptual problems presented by the attempt offense when ana-
lyzed from the perspective of the means-end conflict of the competi-
tive process. Should the attempt offense relate only to the end of the
competitive process-allocative efficiency-and therefore remain
bound to the monopolization offense, or should the attempt offense
cover the means of the competitive process-unfettered competi-
tion-and therefore constitute an offense independent from actual
monopolization? Moreover, the economic basis for the attempt of-
fense may not be the only relevant concern. The following more
fundamental issues arise: what economic theory applies, and does
that theory converge with the political and social values underlying
antitrust regulation?17 Finally, the concepts borrowed from the
criminal law of attempt" make a determination of the proper role
of attempted monopoly even more difficult. Do concepts of criminal
attempt have a place in antitrust analysis, and if so, are they consis-
tent with the economic goals of the competitive process?'9
The impractical economics of antitrust litigation are the second
reason for the present controversy. Because the antitrust litigant
faces prohibitive costs, any new conceptualization of the attempt
offense might have a significant effect on the settlement value of the
case. Without proper safeguards a pro-plaintiff standard"0 encour-
ages settlement of nonmeritorious claims. On the other hand, the
courts should not ignore the common defense tactic of outspending
16. See Part V infra.
17. See Part m infra.
18. Justice Holmes, relying on a criminal case he had decided earlier in his judicial
career, Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272, 59 N.E. 55,56 (1901), adapted criminal
doctrine into attempts to monopolize in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905):
Intent . . .is essential to such an attempt. Where acts are not sufficient in themselves
to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but
require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass,
an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that
it will happen . . . .But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability
exist, this statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself
against that dangerous probability as well as against the completed result.
Id. at 396.
19. See Note, Attempt to Monopolize: The Offense Redefined, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 704
(criticizing the application of criminal concepts to attempted monopoly).
20. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964); Blecher, supra note 15.
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less resourceful plaintiffs who file meritorious claims.2'
Despite the significant conceptual and practical problems war-
ranting resolution, the Supreme Court has refused to answer defini-
tively the questions posed by the lower court controvery. 2 Last term
the Court once again denied certiorari in cases in which the litigants
sought delineation of the required elements of the attempt offense.
23
The Court should review the attempt issue not only because lower
courts cannot agree on the subject but also because judicial formu-
lation of attempt standards suffers from a dearth of economic analy-
sis. Moreover, review of the attempt offense should include re-
evaluation of the scope of antitrust policy, the reach of the present
law, and the proper role of attempted monopoly within the competi-
tive framework.2 1 Successful formulation of a legal standard for at-
tempted monopoly depends on the Court's ability to resolve the
underlying economic and social policy questions.
II. ANTITRUST POUCY
Legal principles are valid only to the extent they accurately
reflect the values of the society they are to govern. Inadequate for-
mulation of normative antitrust values has contributed directly to
the attempt to monopolize controversy.2 5 The judiciary has devel-
oped the legal structure of the attempt offense without first ascer-
taining the values that give validity to the legal terms and determin-
ing the purpose that the legal principles are to serve. 26 The initial
step, therefore, is to rethink the standards that should govern the
competitive process, and after identifying and evaluating the rele-
vant values, to fix a meaningful target at which the antitrust arsenal
should aim.
A. Legislative and Judicial Treatment of Purpose
Although the courts have placed little reliance on the legislative
21. The problem becomes particularly acute when, as in antitrust litigation, massive
pretrial discovery sharply increases the costs to both parties.
22. See Part V(A) infra.
23. Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 69 (1977); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
24. See Parts II(B)-(C) infra.
25. The courts have made no serious inquiry into the peculiar underlying values af-
fected by various formulations of attempt doctrine. For a general discussion of antitrust
policy, see Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 1207 (1969).
26. Part of the problem is attributable to the failure to recognize that the emerging
industrial and social structure has altered values. See Part II(C) infra.
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history of the Sherman Act in interpreting its substantive provi-
sions,2 the concerns that prompted its passage obviously are rele-
vant to a contemporary understanding of antitrust policy. 28 The
original resolution introduced by Senator Sherman demonstrates
the drafters' primary concern with preserving "freedom of trade and
production. 21 9 Moreover, the economic values articulated by Sena-
tor Sherman maintained vitality throughout the ensuing debates
and the ultimate passage of the Act."0 On the other hand, social and
political values apart from the drafters' faith in classical economic
theory provided equal, if not stronger, impetus for the antitrust
movement. The proponents objected to the trust primarily because
it created a disturbance in the social order." The trust also bore
obvious resemblance to the political autocrat 2 since economic
27. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (limiting the use of
congressional debates on the Sherman Act); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911).
28. Justice Reed relied heavily on congressional purpose in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948):
It is not for courts to determine the course of the Nation's economic development.
Economists may recommend, the legislative and executive branches may chart legal
courses by which the competitive forces of business can seek to reduce costs and increase
production so that a higher standard of living may be available to all. The evils and
danger of monopoly and attempts to monopolize that grow out of size and efforts to
eliminate others from markets, large or small, have caused Congress and the Executive
to regulate commerce and trade in many respects . . . .The very broadness of terms
such as restraint of trade, substantial competition and purpose to monopolize have
placed upon the courts the responsibility to apply the Sherman Act so as to avoid the
evils at which Congress aimed.
Id. at 526. See also THORELU, supra note 5, at 164-214.
29. 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888).
30. See THORELLI, supra note 5, at 166-210. The original resolution was consistent with
the classical economic views of its time. The first antitrust bill introduced by Senator Sher-
man likewise reflects the economic goal to advance "full and free competition." See BILLS
AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS, S. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1903).
31. In his major speech in support of the proposed antitrust legislation, Senator Sher-
man emphasized:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and
among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of condition, of wealth,
and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the concentration of
capital into vast combinations to control production and trade and to break down com-
petition. These combinations already defy or control powerful transportation corpora-
tions and reach State authorities. They reach out their Briarean arms to every part of
our country. They are imported from abroad. Congress alone can deal with them, and if
we are unwilling or unable there will soon be a trust for every production and a master
to fix the price for every necessity of life.
21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890).
32. Senator Sherman criticized the trust by comparing it with political tyranny:
If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king over the
production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we would not
submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to
1978] ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE
power provided the means for attaining political power. Senator
Sherman expanded the political analogy when he labeled the pro-
posed legislation a "bill of rights" and a "charter of liberty, 33
clearly indicating an intent to preserve free competition not only for
the sake of economic efficiency but also for the paternal benefit of
the less powerful economic interests.
The judicial analysis of Sherman Act purpose and policy re-
flects an understanding of similar values. In Northern Pacific Rail-
way Co. v. United States34 the Court acknowledged the close rela-
tionship between the economic, political, and social goals of anti-
trust:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices,
the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question,
the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.3
An appreciation of social and ethical values that cannot be attrib-
uted directly to the purpose of promoting economic efficiency per-
meates the opinions. Values including "equality of opportunity," 36
protection from "subversive or coercive" influences of monopoly,3
and a fear of "collective power"38 demonstrate that Congress in-
prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.
Id. at 2457.
33. Id. at 2456-62. See also the remarks of Senator Pugh, citing the promotion of free-
dom and fairness of competition as the public policy to be furthered. Id. at 2558-59.
34. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
35. Id. at 4. Other formulations of the economic goals of the Sherman Act use slightly
different terms, but the common thread of securing competition runs throughout. See, e.g.,
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (prevent restraints to free competition
in business and commercial transactions); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 59
(1920) (secure competition and preclude practices that tend to defeat it); United States v.
Union Pacific R.R., 226 U.S. 61, 82 (1912) (preserve free action of competition); United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 337 (1897) (the law of free and unrestricted
competition is the controlling element in the business world). For a judicial discussion of the
political and social aspects of antitrust, see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
at 535-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. See Charles A. Ramsey Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923):
"The fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and to
protect the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade." See also United States v. American
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
37. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
38. The Court persistently has recognized the importance of individual enterprise and
sagacity as an essential component of the classical competitive process. See, e.g., United
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tended to terminate great aggregations of capital in order to alle-
viate the helplessness of the individual.39 Even the Alcoa decision,"
the first sophisticated treatment of the economic issues of antitrust
and the pillar of contemporary monopolization law, emphasized the
noneconomic values to be considered in applying the Sherman Act:
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monopoly;
but, as we have already implied, there are others, based upon the belief that
great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their
economic results .... Throughout the history of these statutes it has been
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve,
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in
small units which can effectively compete with each other."
B. Competing Policy Perspectives on Antitrust
The description of the Sherman Act as a "charter of liberty"4
has sparked a debate that emanates from the self-destructive nature
of the free enterprise system.43 The vacillation of economic policy
between preservation of competition and protection of competitors44
reflects the inherent conflict between the allocative goals of the
competitive process and the political and social consequences of
unrestrained competition. The attempt offense is significant be-
cause it places stark emphasis upon these competing antitrust val-
ues. In virtually every attempt case the court must endeavor to
harmonize economic efficiency with conduct that is socially, politi-
cally, or ethically undesirable.45 The extent to which attempted
monopoly draws the conflicting values into opposition explains why
the courts have had great difficulty in formulating attempt stan-
dards.
One side of the debate advocates the economic goal of efficiency
to the exclusion of all social, political, and ethical considerations46
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945).
39. 1 H. TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 108 (1949).
40. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
41. Id. at 428-29. The legislative history of the Sherman Act supports Judge Hand's
observation: "If the concerted powers of this combination are intrusted to a single man, it is
a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to the
strong resistance of the State and national authorities." 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
42. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
44. See Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965).
45. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961). See generally Turner, supra note 15.
46. See Bork & Bowman, supra note 44, at 370 (labeling Judge Hand's Alcoa statement
as "dubious, and indeed radical, social policy").
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and labels as "protectionist 4 7 the acknowledgment of any noneco-
nomic value. According to this view such values represent an anti-
competitive strain that has produced a contemporary crisis in anti-
trust." Professor Posner49 has joined this faction and has concluded
that the single goal of antitrust law should be to promote efficiency
in the economic sense 0 The other side of the debate takes the
position that antitrust law cannot be defended solely on the basis
of economics. 1 Instead, this side views antitrust as having a signifi-
cantly broader base, including, in addition to economic efficiency,
the goals of minimal political interference and the advancement of
individual liberty and opportunity.5 2
C. The Convergence of Economic and Noneconomic Values
Both sides to the debate implicitly assume that the economic
and noneconomic values of antitrust law necessarily conflict. Al-
though the social or political values occasionally tend to contradict
the goal of economic efficiency, the sociopolitical values more often
support the economic values espoused by the antiprotectionists.
47. Id. at 364.
48. Id. at 375-76. See also Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
401 (1965); Bowman, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: H, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 417 (1965).
49. Richard A. Posner is a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School.
50. R. POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMc PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976). Professor Posner
initially analyzes the economic basis of antitrust and then discounts three sociopolitical
objections to monopoly. First, he concludes that the argument against the monopoly wealth
transfer from consumers to producers loses force since consumers' losses will not remain with
producers but instead will be dissipated in the activity of becoming a monopolist. Compare
this conclusion with Part III infra. Second, he finds the evidence that amalgamation of
economic power bears a direct relation to political power inconclusive. Finally, Professor
Posner finds populist support of small business to be an unworkable alternative:
The idea that there is some special virtue in small business compared to large is a
persistent one. I am not prepared to argue that it has no merit whatever. I am, however,
confident that antitrust enforcement is an inappropriate method of trying to promote
the interests of small business as a whole. The best overall antitrust policy from the
standpoint of small business is no antitrust policy, since monopoly, by driving a wedge
between the prices and the costs of the larger firms in the market . . ., enables the
smaller firms in the market to survive even if their costs are higher than those of the
large firms.
POSNER, supra, at 19. For an analysis of Professor Posner's policy as applied to § 1 of the
Sherman Act, see Note, Conscious Parallelism and the Sherman Act: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1227 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 377 (1965).
52. Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
422 (1965). The authors emphasize that the concept of multiple objectives is hardly new to
antitrust. Concern over the preservation of self-policing markets, with a view to minimizing
the role of government, and over the protection of individuals from oppression and foreclosure
of opportunities by economically powerful interests has been prevalent from the inception of
antitrust law. See Part H(A) supra.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Individual liberty certainly plays a key role in the classical economic
scheme since the initial step toward optimal resource allocation
requires individual determination of output based on each firm's
unique cost structure.53 Freedom of opportunity not only is consis-
tent with notions of allocative or technical efficiency54 but also is
essential to competitive equilibrium. Ease of entry and exit, the
means of assuring that entrepreneurs earn no supernormal profit55
in the long run, necessarily entails encouragement of opportunity for
the individual. Finally, populist support for small business is consis-
tent in many instances with the classical concept of economic atom-
ization, for essential to the model of perfect competition is a market
composed of many individual firms, each small enough with respect
to total industry output that individual output changes have no
visible effect on market price.56
Because in the abstract noneconomic values exist alongside,
and interact with, the economic goals of antitrust, antitrust policy
not only should take into account the economic goals of allocative
and technical efficiency but also should consider the broader social,
political, and ethical values. These noneconomic values include
minimizing political interference with the market system, dispers-
ing political power by limiting concentration of economic power,
and preserving individual liberty and freedom of opportunity
through encouragement of small business. Moreover, a code of
moral behavior should operate within the competitive process to
establish limits beyond which conduct becomes unacceptable. The
promotion of a business ethic to encourage fairness of competition
augments the policy base of antitrust. Finally, because concentra-
tion of capital leads to inequality of wealth and condition, one of the
noneconomic goals should be the promotion of social stability.
No particular analytical problem arises when the efficiency
goals and the sociopolitical goals converge. Questions arise instead
when the activity has no effect on economic efficiency, so that only
the noneconomic values support antitrust regulation; 57 the activity
53. See Gellhorn, supra note 2.
54. Allocative efficiency refers to the extent that prices accurately reflect relative costs,
so that consumer preferences bring about production of the optimal variety and quantity of
goods and services. Technical efficiency refers to the proximity of actual cost of production
to the lowest possible cost given existing levels and types of output.
55. Supernormal profit is any return to the entrepreneurial factor of production above
the normal return required before diversion of resources to an alternative use.
56. See Gellhorn, supra note 2.
57. This is the case in the typical attempt claim when the defendant's market share is
so small that no traditional economic effect is discernible, but conduct is abusive. In the
[Vol. 31:309
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promotes economic efficiency at the expense of social, political, or
ethical values; or the activity promotes sociopolitical values at the
expense of economic efficiency. 8 While this Note contends that the
courts have overstated the number of cases in which these values
diverge, 9 a sound basis exists for acknowledging the noneconomic
goals and for occasionally giving them preference over classical no-
tions of economic efficiency when conflicts arise.
One reason for preserving social, political, and ethical values in
antitrust analysis is the decreasing credibility of the economic
theory upon which efficiency values rest. The structure of the Amer-
ican economy hardly resembles that envisaged by the classical
theorists."° Economists have contended for over forty years that the
efficiency model of perfect competition has no practical applica-
tion.' The divergence between the actual and the theoretical has
become so acute that the classical model also has questionable va-
lidity as a competitive norm. Similarly, the modern breakthrough
in macroeconomic theory already approaches obsolescence. The
familiar Keynesian function" governing fiscal management has
questionable application in an economy whose public sector has
overtaken private enterprise . 3 Therefore, although economic effi-
ciency remains a fundamental goal of antitrust, economic theory
inadequately explains to the courts how best to achieve that goal.
Because the theory lags behind, the courts should pursue more ac-
tively the sociopolitical goals that jurists are more competent to
achieve.
The structural evolution of American business also justifies the
stronger emphasis of noneconomic concerns. The socioeconomic
structure of the late nineteenth century, in which entrepreneurs
faced each other as discrete and wholly individual units, closely
aggregate, however, there is a social cost attached to this type of behavior. See Part I(A)
infra.
58. See Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
59. See Part I infra.
60. Compare SMITH and MILL, supra note 1, with J. GALBREATH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL
STATE (1967) and R. HEILBRONER, BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SocIALIsM (1970). For an excellent
treatment of the entire transition from Adam Smith to the present, see R. HEILBRONER, THE
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS (4th ed. 1972).
61. E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1932); J. ROBINSON,
THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1934).
62. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936). See
P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, ch. 11-14 (9th ed. 1973).
63. See note 60 supra. The proposed federal budget, for example, exceeds $500 billion.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1978, at 13, col. 1. Together with state and local government spending,
the public sector clearly dominates the content of gross national product.
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resembled "free competition." When Congress adopted the Sher-
man Act in 1890, the relationship among business entities was one
of atomistic opposition." On the other hand, the regulative principle
that most accurately characterizes the socioeconomic movement of
advanced capitalism is not "free competition" but "stabilizing co-
operation."6 5 Increasing economic interdependence and the abrupt
emergence of public enterprise have transformed the modern econ-
omy into an economy predicated on "pluralism."66 Unlike the indi-
vidualism brought about by atomization under free competition,
pluralism rests on mutual cooperation or moral behavior between
potential litigants.
The changing socioeconomic structure, in increasing the mu-
tual interdependence among participants in the competitive pro-
cess, consequently has altered normative values.66 To some extent
the classical paradox69 of laissez-faire economics has been resolved
by the natural evolution of the competitive process. Radical individ-
ualism no longer governs the competitive system. The emerging
economic order7 0 of cooperation instead is fashioned upon a new
moral concept of fairness, a value commensurate with the flexible,
interdependent transactions of advanced capitalism.7'
Antitrust policy makers should not ignore the extent to which
political enactments determine economic activity and perform-
ance.7 2 Reliance upon economic efficiency as the sole purpose of
antitrust regulation demonstrates a faulty perception of the Ameri-
can social, economic, and political structure. The broadly based
64. Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARv. L. REV. 302, 309 (1977) (R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977)). See also note 5 supra and accompanying text.
65. Gabel, supra note 64, at 309. For an elaborate treatment of the multiple trends
converging on the concept of group interaction, see K. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL
REVOLUTION (1953).
66. Gabel, supra note 64, at 310. Horizontal and vertical integration, diversification,
and concentration in industry and labor cause increased interdependence.
67. Id. The Uniform Commercial Code, with its fundamental reliance on trade stan-
dards of fairness and good faith, provides a prime example of the new emphasis on cooperative
or moral behavior. Other examples cited by Gabel include the expansion of strict liability in
tort, collective bargaining in labor, administrative arbitration, and equal protection clause
litigation. The utilization of risk allocation theory in the vicarious liability field provides
another example. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
68. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1967).
69. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
70. See GALBREATH, supra note 60; HEILBRONER, supra note 60.
71. Gabel, supra note 64.
72. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. The intrusion of the public sector into
the private through tax policy, welfare programs, and direct regulation of trade, health, and
safety must be added to the public intrusion arising from spending alone.
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view of antitrust policy thus more accurately reflects the actualities
and the demands of the existing competitive process. Within this
framework, the courts should establish two goals. First, they should
re-evaluate the contemporary values that society desires antitrust
policy to address, taking into account both the new economic struc-
ture of society and the shortcomings of economic theory in dealing
with that structure. Second, the courts should adopt antitrust stan-
dards that conform to contemporary antitrust policy.
IH. CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE ASPECTS OF
ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE
A. Anticompetitive Effect of Attempted Monopolization
The traditional conceptualization of attempt to monopolize
gives that offense meaning only as an appendage to, or precursor of,
completed monopolization.73 The only evil arising from an attempt
to monopolize when so analyzed is the possibility that monopoliza-
tion will result.74 The traditionalists are concerned only with the
potential welfare loss associated with monopoly. 5 Attempt to mo-
nopolize therefore generates legal concern only if there is a
"dangerous probability"7 that monopolization-and hence welfare
loss-will result.
The attempt cases fall into two groups.77 First are those cases
that explicitly acknowledge the dangerous probability requirement
and therefore view the attempt provision as no more than a stop-
gap means of avoiding actual monopolization. Under this view at-
tempted monopoly causes legal concern because it increases the
likelihood of monopoly welfare loss.78 The other group of cases"
commonly view the prohibition of attempt to monopolize as an end
73. Cooper, supra note 15 (discussing attempted monopoly in its "natural role of anal-
ogy to completed monopolization"); see Part V(B) infra.
74. This analysis is due to the borrowed conceptualization from the criminal law. See
notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. The Court subsequently has applied notions of
criminal law to the substantive offenses of § 2. For example, while attempt crimes are
generally merged into the completed criminal offense, the Court has held that a defendant
may be convicted of both conspiracy to monopolize and actual monopoly for a single transac-
tion. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
75. See Gellhorn, supra note 2; Kamerschen, supra note 7; Siegfried & Tiemann, The
Welfare Cost of Monopoly: An Inter-Industry Analysis, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 190 (1974); Posner,
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
76. See note 18 supra. See also notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
77. Part V(B)-(C) infra.
78. The majority view among the lower courts, discussed in Part V(B) infra, rests on
this policy basis.
79. E.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964); see Part V(C) infra (discussing Lessig and its progeny).
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in itself, independent from any practical or conceptual link with
monopolization.'" None of the cases has justified this departure from
the traditional view on economic grounds. A basis exists, nonethe-
less, to support the developing body of opinion8 and to give the
attempt offense an independent existence in terms of economic effi-
ciency and welfare maximization.
Economists have identified three adverse economic effects of
monopolistic resource misallocation. First is the transfer payment
from consumers to producers that results from supracompetitive
pricing.82 This transfer, the familiar profit rectangle of the monopo-
list, results in the loss of part of the surplus consumers would enjoy
in a perfectly competitive market. 83 Second, monopoly produces a
dead-weight welfare loss,84 a portion of consumer surplus that is
neither captured by consumers nor the monopolist.85 More recently
Posner has identified a third effect 6 that accounts for the opportun-
ity cost of alternatives foregone and resources expended by the
would-be monopolist in its effort to establish a monopoly. Quanti-
fication of the magnitude of total welfare loss has proved difficult, 8
but the existence of same loss is undisputed.
Attempted monopoly produces economic loss indistinguishable
from that of monopoly. Market power is not a discrete, unique char-
acteristic of the monopolistic market, but is instead a continuum
that begins the instant market structure diverges from the perfectly
competitive model.89 Attempted monopolization by any individual
firm causes a transfer payment from consumers to producers at least
80. The minority views therefore rest on the policy ground that regulation of the means
of the competitive process is an appropriate goal in itself. See text accompanying notes 16-
17 supra.
81. See, e.g., Baker, Section 2 Enforcement: The View From the Trench, 41 ANTITRUST
L.J. 613 (1972).
82. Since the monopolist faces a downward sloping demand curve, the result of its
profit-maximizing output and price level (where marginal cost equals marginal revenue) is
less output and higher prices than in the competitive market. The extent to which the
monopoly price exceeds marginal cost at the monopoly output is therefore one measure of the
economic inefficiency caused by monopoly. This loss is approximated by the monopoly prof-
its. Under perfect competition, this portion of the competitive surplus would pass instead to
consumers. See Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 33-35.
83. Id. See also SAMUELSON, supra note 62, chs. 22-26.
84. Resource misallocation explains why the dead-weight loss results. Given society's
preferences, it could increase total utility by shifting resources elsewhere. Consequently,
Gellhorn labels this loss the "sinister force" of monopoly. See Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 35.
85. See note 75 supra.
86. Posner, supra note 75.
87. Id.
88. See Kamerschen, supra note 7; Siegfried & Tiemann, supra note 75.
89. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 195, 259 (2d ed. 1974).
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in the short run even if the firm does not achieve actual monopoliza-
tion in the legal sense." At the same time, a dead-weight loss is
created when supernormal profits are earned; consequently, at-
tempted monopoly produces a short-run welfare loss. In the aggre-
gate, a series of attempted monopolizations transforms the short-
run loss into a long-run dead-weight loss similar to that of actual
monopolization. The aggregative loss occurs even if the attempts are
undertaken by separate firms or if they occur in unrelated indus-
tries. Under dynamic analysis, a series of discrete losses produces a
fixed, concrete welfare loss in the long run. While the dead-weight
loss from any single attempt that proves unsuccessful may be negli-
gible, the total loss of such attempts in the long run may prove
substantial. Therefore, in view of the economics of market power,
attempted monopoly and actual monopolization logically are identi-
cal under long-run analysis. 1
Application of the opportunity cost concept" to the attempted
monopoly setting is even more striking. The resources utilized by
potential monopolists in attempting to achieve monopoly constitute
a welfare loss whether or not the would-be monopolist is ultimately
successful. As a result of these expenditures, the opportunity cost
of foregone alternatives is a welfare loss attributable to attempted
monopoly as well as to achieved monopoly, and the extent of the loss
is analytically independent from the completed offense itself. Con-
sequently, prohibition of attempted monopolization is logically de-
fensible from the economic perspective. Moreover, the economic
inefficiency produced is not dependent upon the loss traditionally
associated with actual monopolization. The minority conceptuali-
zation of attempted monopolization as a self-contained phenome-
non independent from the monopoly -offense is therefore justifiable
in economic terms.
Economic analysis of attempted monopolization thus isolates
the same three anticompetitive effects produced by actual monop-
oly-the transfer payment, the dead-weight loss, and the opportun-
ity cost. Each variable, however, operates independently in the at-
tempted monopoly setting, and most cases will require separate
90. There is no logical reason why the judicially imposed brand of monopoly power has
to fall at 70% market share. Supracompetitive pricing certainly can occur below that level.
While the Alcoa rule of thumb may be an expedient policy tool, it cannot serve to disprove
the anticompetitive pricing that may occur with lower market share. See text accompanying
notes 202-03 infra.
91. Professor Scherer emphasized the importance of long-run analysis in the antitrust
field in Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REV. 869 (1976).
92. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
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evaluation of each variable before the overall competitive effect
appears. For example, the transfer payment and dead-weight loss
components tend to vary directly with the proximity to actual mo-
nopoly. The larger the market share-and hence the closer to
''monopoly power" in the legal sense-the larger the quantitative
effect of the transfer payment and the dead-weight loss. On the
other hand, in most cases the opportunity cost variable will increase
in magnitude the farther the would-be monopolist is from attaining
monopoly status, since the defendant must expend more resources
in order to transverse a longer portion of the market power contin-
uum.
In practice the opportunity cost component of attempted mo-
nopoly welfare loss appears to be the largest in magnitude. For
instance, when the nonmonopolist engages in predatory pricing, no
transfer payment or dead-weight loss arises in the short run since
the price actually is set below the competitive level. While the pre-
datory price cutter anticipates sufficient long-run gain to overcome
the short-run loss, that anticipated gain will not arise until the price
cutter acquires sufficient market power to charge a supracompeti-
tive price. Often the price cutter will reach legal monopoly status
first, so that the transfer payment and dead-weight loss are monop-
oly consequences; the attempted monopoly itself produces no com-
parable loss. Even in this setting, however, the opportunity cost
component acts to detect a significant attempted monopoly welfare
loss. The resources consumed by the price cutter and the opportuni-
ties foregone during the predatory pricing campaign are therefore
independent social welfare losses that justify proscription of preda-
tory pricing by the nonmonopolist.
A similar example demonstrates that attempted monopoly wel-
fare loss may even exceed the welfare loss of actual monopoly. The
monopolist in fact may not charge the full monopoly price in order
to avoid the attention of antitrust enforcers or potential competi-
tors. Consequently, the transfer payment and dead-weight loss
might be negligible despite high market share. Similarly, an estab-
lished monopolist employing limit-pricing tactics generates no ap-
preciable opportunity cost. As a result, the welfare loss created by
the nonmonopolist in its predatory bid for monopoly status could
substantially outweigh the welfare loss produced by the conserva-
tive actual monopolist.
B. Noneconomic Values and Attempted Monopolization
An increasing number of courts have recognized noneconomic
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values in attempt analysis. 3 Because attempt to monopolize is an
independent threat to allocative efficiency and to the preservation
of pluralistic values, conduct that is inconsistent with those values,
whether economic, social, or political, should be proscribed.94 Given
the long-run anticompetitive effect of attempted monopolization
and the new judicial emphasis upon the noneconomic values under-
lying cooperative stabilization, attempted monopolization should
be expanded to cover the means of the competitive process, and
monopolization should be reserved for preservation of the competi-
tive end alone. 5
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States" illustrates the means-end
dichotomy and its relation to attempted and actual monopolization.
Lorain Journal stands for the general proposition that misuse of
monopoly power to limit threatened competition constitutes an at-
tempt to monopolize." Despite the fact that the Journal enjoyed a
substantial monopoly in news and advertising dissemination, the
Court concentrated on the means employed to limit competition-a
forced secondary boycott of the sole competitor.98 The likely explan-
93. Professor Turner seems to have originated the de-emphasis of market analysis in
attempt and conspiracy cases under § 2. Turner, supra note 15. The Ninth Circuit has led
the judicial battle toward establishing a conduct offense under § 2. See Part V(C)(1) infra.
94. The reasons for treating the element of monopoly differently must stem from
differences in the element of conduct involved in each offense. In examining these differ-
ences, I think the attenuation of the monopoly concept in attempt and conspiracy cases
can easily be justified, and so can the transition to a more careful consideration of
monopoly in instances of combination.
The kind of conduct that typically establishes the requisite "specific intent" in
attempt and conspiracy cases is clearly conduct which has no social or economic justifi-
cation. No benefits can be expected, at least in the long run, from predatory price-
cutting, coercive refusal to sell, and similar abuses of economic power. If defendants are
attempting to drive someone out of the market by foul means rather than fair, there is
ample warrant for not resorting to any refined analysis as to whether the intent is to drive
everyone out or whether, having taken over all of the production of a particular commod-
ity, the defendants would still face effective competition from substitutes. Coercive
conduct is analogous to price fixing, attempts at which are illegal "though no overt act
is shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available for
accomplishment of their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part of
the interstate or foreign commerce in the commodity."
Turner, supra note 15, at 305.
95. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
96. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
97. Id. See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,
273 U.S. 359 (1927); Cooper, supra note 15.
98. Two explanations have been offered. The Court possibly was concerned that the
competitor had not yet been completely destroyed. See Cooper, supra note 15, at 404. On the
other hand, the Court suggests that the Journal enjoyed a natural monopoly. See Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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ation for the Court's reluctance to employ the monopolization
clause is that the relevant market could support only one firm.9
The Lorain Court acknowledged that certain conduct should be
proscribed in the course of attaining the competitive or noncompeti-
tive goal, even when monopoly can be economically justified. Conse-
quently, the means employed by a participant in the competitive
process should be subjected to antitrust scrutiny regardless of the
economic effects of the ultimate product of those means, 100 and the
attempt offense should be the tool employed to control conduct
whenever the economic justification for application of the monopoli-
zation provision is lacking. 10 The attempt and monopolization con-
cepts should be directed at two independent phenomena. Monopoly
analysis should be concerned primarily with the structural effects
of a competitor's victory in the competitive struggle; °2 attempt
analysis should be concerned with conduct of competitors and the
means by which they participate in the competitive process.0 3
IV. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CONTROLLING CONDUCT
The preceding discussion suggests both economic and nonecon-
omic reasons for prohibiting attempted monopoly apart from the
traditional justification that attempt to monopolize should be pro-
hibited because it increases the likelihood of actual monopoly.
Moreover, given the independent relationship between the attempt
offense and the completed offense of monopolization, the two of-
fenses are properly directed at separate and distinct aspects of the
competitive process. The next step is to extend the inquiry beyond
section two of the Sherman Act and to consider its companion provi-
sions and the alternative means of controlling conduct under the
99. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D.
Mass. 1959), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 833 (1961).
100. In Union Leader Judge Wyzanski pointed out the proximity between exclusionary
practices and the use of unfair means: "In a situation where it is inevitable that only one
competitor can survive, the evidence which shows the use, or contemplated use, of unfair
means is the very same evidence which shows the existence of an exclusionary intent." 180
F. Supp. at 140.
101. Closer scrutiny of the means employed in Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977), for example, may have
produced a contrary result despite the obvious justification for the natural monopoly.
102. The de-emphasis of the conduct aspect of monopoly (often called the transitive
verb requirement) since Alcoa demonstrates the Court's structural emphasis in monopoly
cases. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); text accompanying notes 202-03 infra.
103. See AREEDA, supra note 89, at 244-45, 259. The offensiveness of the conduct there-
fore is relevant and, contrary to monopoly, the structural effect should not be the sole concern.
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antitrust laws. The complementary relationship between section
two and other antitrust provisions elucidates the difficulties en-
countered in attempt analysis and suggests an appropriate at-
tempted monopoly standard.
A. The Relationship Between Section One and Section Two
The most significant feature of section one of the Sherman Act
is the requirement of concerted action."0 4 In contrast, the attempted
monopoly and monopoly offenses of section two noticeably lack this
requirement.'"5 Consequently, under the Sherman Act the only
means of controlling single-firm conduct and performance that does
not rise to the gravamen of an Alcoa monopoly is to use the attempt
to monopolize clause. The traditional relegation of attempted mo-
nopoly to a mere appendage of monopoly has created a gap in anti-
trust enforcement under the Sherman Act.' According to the pre-
vailing rule, an individual firm can engage in any practice, no mat-
ter how abusive or economically inefficient, without incurring liabil-
ity provided that the practice is not on the verge of producing actual
monopolization." 7
The judiciary has responded intuitively to close the gap created
by the misconception of the attempt offense. The majority result,
however, has not been to re-evaluate and redefine the attempt of-
fense, but to manipulate other Sherman Act provisions in an effort
to cover the single-firm void. In this endeavor the courts have re-
sorted primarily to a questionable attenuation of the conspiracy
concept under section one; as a result both section two and section
one have been misconstrued in the process.
One example of the infectious nature of the attempted monop-
oly misconception is the Supreme Court's treatment of restricted
distribution and refusals to deal under section one.' The supplier
104. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
105. Conspiracy to monopolize under § 2 is also a concerted conduct offense. While
concerted action is not a requisite to an attempt to monopolize, some courts have held that
two or more persons concertedly may attempt to monopolize. See, e.g., United States v.
Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., 501 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 504 F.2d 760, cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1974).
106. Cooper, supra note 15. The author acknowledges the wide range of single firm
behavior presently outside the Sherman Act, but concludes that the monopoly offense and
not attempted monopoly is the appropriate means of expanding coverage of single firm
conduct.
107. See Part V(B) infra.
108. For a discussion of the vertical agreement problem under § 1, see AREEDA, supra
note 89, at 553.
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in a vertical relationship may, under the Colgate doctrine,'"9 indi-
vidually refuse to deal with a buyer or distributor without incurring
liability. In order to avoid the per se sanction of resale price mainte-
nance,110 the supplier therefore may "suggest" retail prices to dis-
tributors at the outset and then unilaterally refuse to deal with
those who do not maintain the suggested price. The Court has be-
come increasingly willing to strain the concept of contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy in order to find concerted action in this and
related situations. As a result the exception to the Colgate doctrine
has swallowed the rule."'
Albrecht v. Herald Co. 112 demonstrates the degree to which the
"agreement" requirement under section one has become atten-
uated. The defendant newspaper terminated the holder of a newspa-
per route for refusing to sell newspapers at the required retail price
and subsequently replaced the plaintiff with a new seller. Although
the evidence did not establish any dealings between the defendant
and the new seller beyond the mere assumption of plaintiff's route,
the Court found sufficient concerted action to warrant the finding
of an agreement.
A related problem arises when the distributor refuses to accede
to the supplier's initial demands for adherence to a territorial alloca-
tion scheme or to retail price maintenance. In such cases the plain-
tiff has no cause of action under section one because of the absence
of an agreement, even if it is driven out of business for refusing to
accede to the seller's demands.1 3 On the other hand, the plaintiff
who consents to the supplier's unlawful demands and is thereby a
party to an illegal agreement may thereafter renege and seek redress
109. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919):
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict
the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private busi-
ness, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.
110. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
111. See note 109 supra. In practice, virtually any step taken by the wholesaler or
manufacturer may qualify as an agreement so that the Colgate requirement of purely unilat-
eral conduct cannot be met. Any offer to reinstate, affirmance of suggested price, or request
for voluntary compliance is generally sufficient.
112. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
113. See AREEDA, supra note 89, at 563. Compare Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329
F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964), with Amplex v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968). See also Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446
F.2d 825 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1971); Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273
(1st Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 801 (1967).
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under section one."' The unjust result of denying a remedy to an
injured party who performs its legal duty while rewarding the com-
petitor who violates its duty follows from undue reliance on section
one to prohibit conduct that is in fact unilateral. This misplaced
conception of "concerted conduct" under section one is, in turn, the
by-product of an ineffective section two device for controlling abu-
sive individual conduct.
The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine provides a second ex-
ample of the fiction created under section one in an effort to close
the single-firm void. In many instances the defendants to a section
one claim are affiliated under a common legal entity. Affiliated
corporations therefore will argue that they are operated as a single
business enterprise and that a single entity is incapable of conspir-
ing with itself."5 In response the Supreme Court has developed the
intraenterprise conspiracy concept, which states, in essence, that
affiliated corporations may conspire in violation of the Sherman Act
notwithstanding the fact of common ownership."' In the process,
however, the courts have constructed the fiction that a corporation
cannot conspire with its unincorporated division, but that it can
conspire with its subsidiary or other affiliated corporation."7 This
nonfunctional distinction has produced inconsistency in cases in
which the courts make no serious inquiry into the manner of opera-
tion of the units."" Again, the inadequate development of attempted
114. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
115. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
116. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (parent
corporation and subsidiary liable for conspiracy since they had availed themselves of the
privilege of doing business in the corporate form); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (two subsidiaries of parent corporation capable of conspiring
with each other); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) (parent
corporation and wholly owned subsidiaries capable of conspiring); United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (corporate affiliation actually facilitates conspiracy).
117. See Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d
203 (5th Cir. 1969); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 319 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1963);
Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
118. Some lower courts have concluded that when one person not only is the sole or
principal owner of the affiliated corporations but also is the only person involved in the
corporations' decision-making process, the person and the affiliated corporations should be
treated as a single entity. See, e.g., Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94 F.
Supp. 388 (D. Md.), aff'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1950). Other courts have retreated from the
hard line drawn by the Supreme Court and have held affiliated corporations incapable of
conspiring when the corporate structure is subservient to the integrated production process




monopoly as an effective means for controlling single-firm conduct
and performance is primarily responsible for the conspiracy atten-
tuation. A broader view of attempt would provide a more logical
basis for controlling conduct in cases clearly involving a unified
functional operation. 1
B. Expanding the Federal Trade Commission Act
Section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act also offers a
potential alternative to expansion of the attempt to monopolize
offense under section two of the Sherman Act. The Federal Trade
Commission has the power to enforce the substantive provisions of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts and, in addition, to prevent unfair
methods of competition.2" The Commission, therefore, is not bound
by the present infirmities of the Sherman Act in controlling single-
firm, conduct, but may go farther than the courts in prohibiting
"unfair" conduct, including conduct that demonstrates no inherent
economic evil.
Several serious limitations detract from the superficial appeal
of the section five alternative. The Act limits the Commission's
authority to the issuance of cease and desist orders,"2 ' and conse-
quently the Commission cannot award compensatory damages to
the victim of the unfair practice. Moreover, the Commission's re-
sources are far too limited to accomplish widespread enforce-
ment-only an insignificant portion of the practices that would be
classified as unfair are disclosed by FTC proceedings. The absence
of any penalty, financial or otherwise, likewise negates the potential
benefit of selective enforcement, for until the Commission detects
and prosecutes the particular practice of the particular defendant,
the defendant is without incentive to cease the unfair practice. Fi-
nally, because private plaintiffs have no cause of action under sec-
tion five, no threat of treble damage recovery is present. Thus, de-
terrence is lacking in an area in which economic reprisal has proved
the most effective enforcement tool.
Section five must be modified if it is to serve as a viable alterna-
tive to attempted monopoly in controlling single-firm behavior. A
provision for a private cause of action is one possibility. Such an
119. Affiliated corporations clearly may perform separate and distinct functions, and
therefore they should be treated as separate entities for Sherman Act purposes. On the other
hand, a division is no less capable of generating anticompetitive effects than a subsidiary,
and the two should be treated the same when they serve the same productive function.




amendment would augment enforcement without sacrificing the
present advantage of the Commission's expertise. The prospect of
awarding damages, however, appears less attractive. The damage
issue in an unfair competition claim might require trial by jury,'
in which event the expertise of the Commission would be lost. Con-
sequently, a private damage action would have little advantage over
the Clayton and Sherman Act procedures.'
Alternatively, the Federal Trade Commission could promulgate
regulations prohibiting certain individual firm practices.24 Identify-
ing specific practices that are unfair under section five would par-
tially offset the disadvantage of selected enforcement, and promul-
gations would avoid the obstacles of a private cause of action. Draft-
ing meaningful regulations in this elusive area of single-firm con-
duct would prove difficult, however, since the context in which the
alleged unfair practice occurs often determines the economic and
social effect of the conduct. Regulations precise enough to allow
more complete enforcement might produce a sufficient number of
undesirable results to outweigh the desired benefit.125 In addition,
FTC promulgations could destroy the flexibility of the Sherman
Act. A principle virtue of the antitrust laws is their constitutional-
like character; the phraseology of the Sherman Act is analogous to
the due process clause both in the abstract and in application.1 26 The
free hand given the Court by Congress to fashion a common law of
antitrust' 1 should be retained to the greatest extent possible in
order to harmonize antitrust policy with the dynamic structural
122. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Although the FTC authority is statutory, the unfair
competition claim existed at common law as well. Consequently, a money damage provision
under the FTC Act might be distinguishable from those under federal statutes such as the
National Labor Relations Act, under which the jury trial argument has been rejected in
claims for back pay. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The expansion
of the right to jury trial since Jones & Laughlin also bears on this point. See Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); cf. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (bankruptcy
setting is an exception to the Westover principle that claims for money damages require trial
by jury).
123. Since the federal courts review FTC decisions, the only difference in procedure
would be at the trial level. If both Clayton Act § 4 claims and FTC § 5 claims would require
trial by jury, the advantage of the Commission's expertise is lost.
124. 4 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 38,005 (1972).
125. Consider, for example, the dispute that has arisen over the formulation of a conclu-
sive standard for assessing predatory pricing. Compare Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing
and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975), with
Scherer, supra note 91.
126. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
127. See Part HI(A) supra.
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movement of the economy.1 2s Judicial expansion of section two at-
tempt doctrine, unlike the promulgation of regulations under sec-
tion five of the FTC Act, can achieve the desired results without
sacrificing the common-law approach to antitrust regulation.
C. State Regulation of Business Practices
Recently the states have assumed more active roles in antitrust
and trade regulation through the enactment of antitrust, fair trade,
price discrimination, and sales-below-cost laws. While many of the
state laws apply only to one or two specific industries or products,'29
virtually every state also has a general antitrust provision. 3 These
provisions of general application vary considerably from state to
state, '3 however, and adoption of the Uniform State Antitrust Act 32
by a significant number of states seems unlikely. 3
Lack of uniformity presents problems in antitrust enforcement
whenever the subject of regulation, regardless of its local nature,
qualifies as interstate commerce under Sherman Act jurisdictional
standards. 34 Disparate state antitrust provisions therefore create
128. See Part II(C) supra. See generally Turner, supra note 25.
129. See, for example, New Jersey's statutory prohibition of price discrimination only
in alcoholic beverages, insurance, and motor fuel, and below cost sales only in cigarettes and
gasoline. 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 33,331, 33,385-86 (1972).
130. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to 109 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-24 to 45
(1975).
131. Some state constitutions contain an antitrust provision, and in many instances
these provisions attack divergent conduct. Compare GA. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 1, with
ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 103. Other state antitrust provisions omit any reference to attempted
monopoly. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 542 (1975); GA. CODE § 20-504 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-1
(1955). A significant number incorporate the basic language of section two of the Sherman
Act, including the general proscription of attempts to monopolize. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §
45.52.020 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-27 (1975). The statutes also differ in mode of enforce-
ment, with some states providing for a private treble damage action, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 35-35 (1975), while others limit the cause of action to the state Attorney General, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 70-102 (1957 Replacement) (limiting penalty for violation to $200-$500 fine to
be paid into the state treasury for the benefit of the common school fund). The Uniform Act,
on the other hand, retains the private cause of action, but limits treble damage recovery to
"flagrant" violations. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 44-1408B (1974).
132. 4 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 30,101 (1972). The National Conference on Uniform
State Laws approved the proposal on August 2, 1973. In February 1974 the American Bar
Association House of Delegates voted approval.
133. Only one state has adopted the Uniform Act. See Amiz. REv. STAT. §§ 44-1401 to
1413 (1974).
134. The jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act is coextensive with the commerce
power. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). Moreo-
ver, virtually any business transaction has an "effect on interstate commerce" under modern
commerce clause standards. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE
potential conflict with the commerce clause,'35 since businesses en-
gaged in interstate commerce may face conflicting and irreconcil-
able local antitrust laws. Even if the federal laws do not occupy the
antitrust field, the conflicting state laws nonetheless may impose an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 3 ' Consequently,
state antitrust regulation does not offer a viable alternative to sec-
tion two of the Sherman Act as the logical vehicle for expanding
single firm control.
Although the Uniform Act moves in the proper direction to the
extent that it resolves the inconsistency among the states, the Act
provides no additional means for controlling single-firm perform-
ance. Additionally, the Act differs significantly from the Sherman
Act, thereby generating potential for direct conflict with federal
antitrust provisions. The Uniform Act, for example, limits the pro-
hibition against restraints and monopolies to those that have a pur-
pose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining
prices.' 37 Unlike the Sherman Act, the Uniform Act interjects di-
rectly into the statutory proscription the requirement that the at-
tempt to establish a monopoly be in a "relevant market.' 13 The Act
defines relevant market, however, as "the geographical area of ac-
tual or potential competition in a line of commerce."'3 On its face
the Uniform Act therefore omits the product component of the Sher-
man Act relevant market requirement for monopoly' and employs
instead the line of commerce approach of the Clayton Act. "' Appar-
ently this proposal would reduce the degree of scrutiny the court
presently gives to relevant-market aspects of attempted monopoly
under the majority view.'
The disparity between state antitrust provisions heightens the
existing controversy among the lower federal courts, and the Uni-
form Act aggravates rather than alleviates the problem. Together
with inactive state enforcement, this incongruity makes a unified
nonfederal solution to the attempt problem virtually impossible.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
136. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
137. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 44-1403 (1974).
138. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACr § 3.
139. Id. § 1(2) (emphasis added).
140. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except
as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976). Arizona did not incorporate either the term relevant
market or the term line of commerce, but instead used the language "any part of which is
within this state." ARiz. REV. STAT. § 44-1403 (1974).
142. See Part V(B) infra.
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Although Congress recently has expressed discontent with state
regulation of fair trade and has repealed enabling legislation that
formerly limited federal antitrust regulation under section one,'
more active state enforcement will generate substantial conflict
with existing federal standards. When conflict occurs the court sim-
ply may disregard the state statute, a customary practice whenever
the commission of business torts is alleged defensively."' Conse-
quently, control of abusive single-firm conduct through more com-
prehensive business tort statutes likewise provides an unattractive
alternative.'
While expansion of attempted monopoly under section two
poses its own problems, the other alternatives are neither more
practically nor conceptually appealing. The section two approach
additionally offers the opportunity to resolve the overextension of
section one conspiracy doctrine, a problem that state laws treat
ineffectively. The ultimate question, therefore, is which legal ap-
proach to section two best facilitates an expansion of attempted
monopoly that is consistent with, and accurately reflects, the con-
ceptual and practical underpinnings of contemporary antitrust pol-
icy.
V. FORMULATING A LEGAL STANDARD
A. Attempt to Monopolize in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has reviewed the attempt-to-monopolize
offense sparingly. In most instances the Court has treated the at-
tempt claim as a peripheral issue, and therefore much of its lan-
guage dealing with attempted monopoly is dictum.'46 Even those
cases that confront the attempt offense directly have unsuccessfully
articulated the requisite elements. 4 ' The Court has not resolved the
ambiguity of Swift' in subsequent decisions-while in some cases
the Court has stated that proof of specific intent to monopolize is
143. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
144. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
145. The use of business tort law creates conceptual problems because the legal means
do not comport with the goal. Antitrust is related to tort law, but its concerns are sufficiently
different to warrant separate treatment. As a result, the law has not followed tort develop-
ment although it has borrowed some major tort concepts.
146. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
147. E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). For Justice Holmes' classic
formulation of the attempt standard in criminal law terms, see note 18 supra. See generally
Note, supra note 15.
148. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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sufficient since dangerous probability of success is simply the conse-
quence of specific intent, '49 on other occasions it has suggested that
dangerous probability is a separate element that must be proved in
addition to specific intent to monopolize.'50
The Court most recently discussed attempt in a passing refer-
ence in Walker Process Equipment, Inc., v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp."'5 Although the Court spoke of the need to appraise
the exclusionary power of the defendant in a relevant market, the
decision does not mention "dangerous probability."'52 In no decision
has the Court dealt meaningfully with the conceptual dichotomy
between attempted monopoly and the completed offense of mono-
polization, nor has it scrutinized the role of attempted monopoly in
the framework of antitrust policy. Since the movement to expand
attempted monopoly began, the Court consistently has rejected the
opportunity to clarify the confusion among lower courts.'53
B. The Dangerous Probability Requirement
The majority of lower courts has adhered to the dangerous
probability requirement.' 4 In these courts the plaintiff must prove,
149. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (no mention of proof
of market power or dangerous probability of actual monopoly in holding conduct that was
not unreasonable under § 1 to constitute an attempt to monopolize under § 2). See also
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (conspiracy to monopolize proved so
long as an appreciable amount of commerce is affected, regardless of market share). Because
the § 2 term "any part of interstate commerce" seems equally applicable to attempt, courts
frequently cite Yellow Cab to support the view that a dangerous probability of success need
not be proved in an attempt case.
150. "'The phrase "attempt to monopolize" means the employment of methods, means
and practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though
falling short, nevertheless approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it. .... '"
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. at 785. The Court's language is suspect
since only the monopoly charge was being reviewed. See also Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (dangerous probability of monopolization found without explicitly
stating that such a determination was a separate requirement along with specific intent to
monopolize); see generally note 96-99 supra and accompanying text.
151. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
152. In fact the case involved an alleged fraudulent patent procurement, the type of
attempt claim that raises more ethical than economic concerns. The Court refused to dismiss
the claim at the motion for summary judgment stage of the proceeding.
153. E.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 69 (1977); Pacific Eng'r and Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977); Panotex Pipe Line Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
457 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v.
C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
154. See Cooper, supra note 15, at 384-88; Note, supra note 15, at 1459-64; see, e.g.,
Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022
(1973); Panotex Pipe Line Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 457 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972); Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir.
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in addition to a specific intent to monopolize, that the defendant's
conduct has brought or will bring it dangerously close to monopoly
power in the relevant market. Therefore, the plaintiff must identify
the relevant product, 5 5 define the relevant geographic market,5 ,
and determine the defendant's share of that market. Generally, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's market share would
have been close to seventy percent had the attempted monopoly
been successful. 51 Under the majority view the plaintiff thus faces
the same procedural and substantive burden in an attempt claim
as in a monopoly case. In practice attempt may prove even more
difficult, since the plaintiff must show specific rather than general
intent.'
The principle virtue of the dangerous probability test is its
deterrence of spurious claims. Because the test places such an ex-
treme burden on plaintiffs at the initial stage of the proceeding, only
the most meritorious claim stands any chance of surviving a prelim-
inary motion.'59 The dangerous probability requirement also offers
the court an alternative to resolving the difficult question of intent
since a finding of insufficient market power dismisses the claim. 6 '
In practice the majority view shifts the balance unduly in favor of
the defendant. The plaintiff bears an insuperable burden whenever
the defendant possesses anything less than near absolute market
control.''
The dangerous probability criterion also is subject to concep-
tual criticism. The term "dangerous probability" has no indepen-
dent economic or legal content. Like "monopoly power," it provides
no definitive standard until the court assigns an arbitrary market
share.6 2 Further, when the market share required for a finding of
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., 403 F. Supp.
527 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
155. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane Case), 351 U.S.
377 (1956).
156. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except
as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
157. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
158. Id.
159. Consequently, most plaintiffs also raise conspiracy allegations to avoid this result,
since issues of fact cannot be resolved on the pleadings. The minority's view of attempt, in
relying on specific intent alone, eliminates this check on spurious claims as a matter of law
since intent, like conspiracy, is a question of fact.
160. See Hawk, supra note 15.
161. See Blecher, supra note 15. The difficulty of proving sufficient market power
becomes particularly acute if the market relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
is vertical. See Cooper, supra note 15.
162. See Part 11(A) supra. Since market power is a continuum, the assignment of the
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dangerous probability and for actual monopoly are the same, the
offenses merge at a single point on the market-power continuum.13
In addition, the dangerous probability requirement brings criminal
attempt doctrine into the antitrust arena.' 4 Assuming, arguendo,
that criminal concepts apply, the majority view suffers from the
erroneous contention that factual impossibility is a defense to at-
tempt.' 5
Despite the potential criminal sanction provided by the Sher-
man Act, notions of criminal attempt are not suited to antitrust
analysis. 6' First, the Sherman Act, unlike other criminal statutes,
has never been construed strictly. The broad range of judicial dis-
cretion and the constitutional-like provisions mandate flexibility,
and the judiciary has not felt constrained in its ever-changing inter-
pretation of the substantive violations. 7 Second, the courts impose
criminal sanctions only in circumstances of repeated violations that
clearly have been defined in prior decisions."8 Finally, no criminal
sanction applies in most instances, because the private litigant
brings the vast majority of antitrust actions. Criminal standards not
only are inconsistent with the policy underpinnings of antitrust, but
also are unnecessary for effective enforcement.
C. Development of the Expansionary View
A number of minority positions question the validity of the
structural approach to attempted monopolization. While the emerg-
ing views range from total abrogation of the dangerous probability
requirement 6 ' to a mere reduction in the share of the market
deemed sufficient to produce the dangerous probability,7 ° all advo-
term "monopoly power" to one segment of that spectrum is somewhat arbitrary. The Court's
reliance on market share as the sole indication of market power poses a related problem. See
also text accompanying notes 202-03 infra.
163. Id.
164. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
165. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRMINAL LAW 438, 440-42 (1972). Assuming the defen-
dant possesses the requisite intent and has taken actual steps toward monopolization, its
absence of monopoly power should not be a defense to a charge of attempt to monopolize.
This situation is analogous to that in which a defendant attempts to commit murder with an
unloaded gun, and the courts consistently have imposed liability in those cases.
166. See Note, supra note 19.
167. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977),
overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
168. The court imposes most criminal sanctions in the price-fixing arena, where the per
se rule is firmly entrenched. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940).
169. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964).
170. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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cate an increasing reliance on conduct and a decreasing concern
with market structure. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment advocates a shift in attempt analysis that roughly corresponds
to the more expansionary version of the minority views.' Taken
together, the divergent positions represent a significant exception to
traditional attempt doctrine.
(1) Specific Intent to Monopolize
The clamor for reform began with Professor Turner's commen-
tary on the Cellophane Case.72 The abuse theory' of attempted
monopoly first appeared in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.,'74 in which
the Ninth Circuit established specific intent to monopolize as the
sole requisite to an attempt violation. In Lessig the plaintiff neither
established a relevant market that was the subject of the attempt
nor proved a dangerous probability of success in that market. Al-
though Lessig has undergone a stormy history in the Ninth Circuit
itself, ' a recent decision reaffirmed the result,' and other courts
occasionally have followed its reasoning. 7
In its most expansionary form, the Lessig approach virtually
established a per se violation. Once the plaintiff proves the requisite
specific intent,1 even the complete absence of market power by the
defendant would not constitute a defense. Subsequent decisions
have tempered the Lessig view, however, so that market power still
is a relevant factor when it serves to disprove specific intent.'79 Thus,
some courts have created a de minimis exception wherein a defen-
dant with negligible market power presumably cannot possess a
specific intent to monopolize. The burden, however, is upon the
defendant to establish that it falls within the de minimis exception;
therefore, the plaintiff's prima facie case does not include proof of
171. Baker, supra note 81.
172. Turner, supra note 15; see note 94 supra.
173. See Cooper, supra note 15. The abuse theory concentrates on conduct rather than
structure in assessing performance.
174. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
175. See Annot., 27 A.L.R. Fed. 762 (1976).
176. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 5 TRAE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,603 (9th
Cir. 1977).
177. Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Mt. Lebanon Motors v.
Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
178. The plaintiff may rely, and usually must rely, on inferential evidence to prove
specific intent. Under the Lessig approach, abusive conduct generally is sufficient to substan-
tiate a finding of specific intent to monopolize. See also note 100 supra.
179. See Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews Co., 473 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1973); Industrial Bldg.
Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970).
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market share sufficient to create a dangerous probability of actual
monopolization.18
(2) Specific Intent in a Relevant Market
In search of a middle ground between the Lessig and dangerous
probability positions, a third approach has discarded the dangerous
probability criterion, but has retained relevant market definition.18 1
Under this approach the plaintiff proves attempted monopoly when
the defendant has a specific intent to monopolize a defined relevant
market, regardless of the defendant's power in that market. As with
Lessig, the plaintiff can show intent in a defendant who does not
possess monopoly power, provided the plaintiff can demonstrate a
predominant motive to acquire monopoly control.182
Retention of relevant-market concepts without requiring proof
of market power achieves two desirable results. First, dangerous
probability is no longer an element of the plaintiff's prima facie
case, giving attempted monopoly an identity independent from the
completed offense of monopolization.Y8 3 Consequently, the plain-
tiff's burden is relaxed significantly, and structural criteria are not
automatically given precedence over competing values. Second, by
requiring the plaintiff to establish a relevant market that is the
object of the alleged attempt, the approach moves toward objectifi-
cation of the otherwise highly subjective Lessig standard. 84 The
most spurious claims fail because plaintiffs cannot connect the al-
leged intent with an appropriate market.
(3) Structure and Conduct on a Sliding Scale
Recognition that both economic and noneconomic values have
a place in antitrust analysis has produced yet another proposal that
accommodates structure and conduct in attempt to monopolize.
Employing a sliding scale test, the plaintiff must demonstrate less
market power as the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct and
the strength of evidence of monopolistic intent increase.'85 In prac-
180. Id.
181. See Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1969);
American Football League v. National Fooball League, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd,
323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. White Bag Co. v. International Paper Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas.
75,188 (4th Cir.); Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968).
182. See cases cited in note 181 supra.
183. See Part III supra.
184. See Hawk, supra note 15.
185. AREEDA, supra note 89, at 258; see Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258
(N.D. Okla.), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1973) (explicitly noting the
1978]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tice the sliding scale relaxes the need to delineate precise boundaries
of the relevant market when the defendant's intent and conduct
clearly are predatory. '
Some courts have applied the sliding scale concept directly to
the dangerous probability requirement. As a result, the plaintiff
may prove dangerous probability through evidence of market power,
but it also may prove dangerous probability through evidence of
specific intent or conduct. ' Specific intent might not be enough to
establish a sufficient likelihood of success, but neither is market
share the sole means for establishing a dangerous probability of
monopolization. '88 This approach is problematic since the dangerous
probability concept is inextricably related to market share. Less
confusion would arise if formalistic notions of dangerous probability
were abandoned whenever the court weighs both conduct and struc-
ture.
(4) Manipulation of the Relevant Market
In those circuits in which the dangerous probability and conse-
quent relevant-market requirements have prevailed, some courts
have expanded attempt coverage by manipulating both the confines
of the relevant market and the requisite share of the market neces-
sary to establish the dangerous probability of success. Courts have
acknowledged that proof of elaborate integration reduces the neces-
sary market share, thereby giving vitality to attempted monopoly
as an enforcement tool apart from actual monopoly.' 9 Shortage situ-
ations provide a second basis for altering traditional market analy-
sis. Absent direct government controls, the relevant market gener-
ally shrinks during a shortage. 9 ' In the short run, unavailability of
Lessig view, balancing it against the dangerous probability view, and endorsing a sliding scale
approach).
186. See materials cited in note 185 supra.
187. See Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973).
188. Koratron Corp. v. Jack Winter, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
189. E.g., Gutor Int'l AG v. Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1974). In
Lektro-Vend Corp. the court held defendant liable for attempted monopoly when its share of
the national market was approximately 20% and increasing:
The "attempt to monopolize" prohibition in section 2 was intended to "nip incipient
monopolies in the bud;" with this congressional policy in mind, considering the structure
of the vending machine industry, the Court believes that, unchecked, Vendo's alleged
practices raise a dangerous propensity for creation of an actual monopoly.
403 F. Supp. at 534.
190. The relevant market must be defined from the buyer's viewpoint in these circum-
stances. See George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1974). Consequently, the market is limited to the extent the buyer cannot turn elsewhere
for an alternative source of supply. See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903
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alternative supply sources creates tremendous leverage for the sup-
plier in a vertical relationship, and any abuse of that power can be
devastating to buyers. 9' Traditional market definition will not re-
veal the actual degree of control exerted by the supplier, and absent
a redefinition of the market, the plaintiff is without a remedy no
matter how abusive the conduct or inefficient the performance.' 2
D. A Proposal for a Rule of Reason Approach
Neither the dangerous probability view nor the Lessig approach
achieves the desired balance between economic and noneconomic
objectives. The two positions are the extremes in attempt analy-
sis-dangerous probability connotes an economic inquiry limited to
market share analysis, while Lessig focuses on behavior and conduct
to the exclusion of economic performance. The difficult problem is
fashioning a legal standard that simultaneously satisfies the concep-
tual quest for balancing values and the practical need for an expedi-
ent rule of law that produces a clearly discernible result for each
factual circumstance.
Fortunately, the courts already are familiar with a Sherman
Act standard that has proven itself in both respects. The rule of
reason' 3 is the logical candidate as the legal mechanism by which
the courts can expand attempt to monopolize in order to achieve
control over single-firm conduct and performance. Although histori-
cally the courts have applied the rule of reason only to contracts,
combinations, or conspiracies under section one, a similar analysis
logically would apply to attempted monopoly under section two.'94
The rule of reason offers breadth and flexibility; the court could
consider all relevant factors, economic and noneconomic, and could
(W.D. Mo. 1975), affd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976).
191. The seller's demand curve may become perfectly inelastic in the shortage situa-
tion, thereby enabling the seller to increase price drastically with no corresponding decrease
in quantity demanded. See Mullis v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 502 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also Byrnes, Lowry, & Bondurant, Product Shortages, Allocation and the Antitrust Laws, 20
ANTrRUST BULL. 713 (1975); 53 TEx. L. REv. 551 (1975).
192. For example, a supplier who also competes directly with its buyer through a sub-
sidiary in the retail market may exert enough leverage during a shortage period to drive the
buyer out of the retail market, or alternatively, to force a more favorable acquisition price.
In either event, the abuse of power in the vertical relationship because of the market shortage
enables the supplier to expand its position in the retail market through its subsidiary. This
result is aggravated when the buyer and seller are signatories to a long term requirements
contract.
193. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
194. The similarity between the traditional § 1 rule of reason approach and the broad




assess the relative merits of each. Because courts have substantial
experience in working with the rule of reason, it offers an additional
advantage over the newly created middle-ground attempt formula-
tions. '95 Moreover, unlike either extreme view of attempt, the rule
of reason easily could accommodate the concept of market power as
a single continuum along which competitive performance must be
measured. '96
The rule of reason proposal will provoke two major criticisms.
First, practitioners will consider the rule indefinite and vague. Both
defendants and the courts prefer to know in advance which specific
practices are prohibited; the nature of antitrust analysis, however,
defies concrete resolution. Virtually any practice may take on a
significantly different antitrust posture depending on its peculiar
setting. Predatory pricing offers a prime example. Analysts have
made more progress toward articulating a conclusive and easily
applicable test for this particular phenomenon than for any other
claim under the Sherman Act. '97 Others have thoughtfully criticized
the across-the-board standard,18 and the courts have been reluctant
to employ it as the sole basis for their decisions.'99 Unfortunately, a
case-by-case approach is the only method by which the courts can
meaningfully achieve the broad policy goals of antitrust.
Second, critics will claim that the rule of reason standard will
create administrative and litigatory inconvenience. Because the rule
of reason would require inquiry into both economic and noneco-
nomic aspects of the case, it potentially would consume more time
than the present economic analysis. To the extent that the expen-
sive and equally time-consuming procedure of precise market defi-
nition decreases in importance, however, the adverse administrative
effect of a rule of reason diminishes. 0 In addition, the strike suit
nightmare of the antitrust defendant 2 ' is not likely to become a
reality so long as the movement away from complete reliance on
market definition succeeds in reducing the costs of attempt litiga-
tion.
195. See Part V(C)(2)-(3) supra.
196. See Part III supra.
197. See note 125 supra.
198. Id.
199. Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 69 (1977); Blecher & Stegman, Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.: A Straw in the Wind?, 38 OHIO
ST. L.J. 269 (1977).
200. The consuming process of market definition in monopoly cases and attempted
monopoly cases in which dangerous probability is a requisite element is primarily responsible
for the prohibitive costs of antitrust litigation.
201. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
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On balance the rule of reason affords the court an opportunity
to engage in a more thorough and more accurate investigation of
single-firm conduct than has heretofore been possible under the
Sherman Act. Most importantly, the new legal formulation would
facilitate treatment of attempt to monopolize as an independent
antitrust violation directed at conduct that is undesirable apart
from its historic connection with actual monopoly. Because existing
legal attempt standards are connected inextricably to an erroneous
conception of attempted monopoly, the new legal standard should
be divorced completely from those principles.
E. The Control of Oligopoly
Application of the proposed expansion of attempted monopoly
to the oligopoly problem demonstrates that the rule of reason can
be an effective standard for controlling undesirable single-firm con-
duct. The control of oligopoly logically can be approached under
either section one or section two of the Sherman Act.12 The critical
issue in oligopoly analysis is whether the concern is structure or
conduct, or both. Economic performance is the ultimate concern,
and structure is just one indicium of performance. The Alcoa mo-
nopoly result, for example, is justifiable only because when market
share reaches seventy percent, poor performance is almost certain
regardless of the conduct or behavior of the monopolist. Poor per-
formance, therefore, is the underlying premise of Judge Hand's vir-
tual per se rule in Alcoa. This certainty does not arise in oligopoly,
however, since no individual firm has a sufficient market share to
invoke the Alcoa premise. Thus in the oligopoly setting both con-
duct and structure must be analyzed before making a final determi-
nation as to performance. 23 Both economic and noneconomic con-
siderations therefore play a role in the analysis. Once again, the
problem with the former is the inadequacy of the economic theory
in explaining oligopolistic efficiency.2"4
Proponents of the structural approach to oligopoly control rely
on section two as the appropriate enforcement mechanism. 25 Legis-
202. Compare Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969), with Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
203. For a discussion of the inconclusiveness of oligopoly theory and performance, see
President's Task Force Report on Productivity and Competition, reprinted in 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 50,108, at 55,134 (1972).
204. See Part II(C) supra. See also AREEDA, supra note 89, at 224-41; SCHERER, supra
note 1.
205. See AREEDA, supra note 89, at 240-41. The Federal Trade Commission has chal-
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lative efforts to curb the expansion of economic power in the oligo-
polistic market also have taken a structural approach."' 8 An alterna-
tive approach focuses instead on the conduct of the oligopolist, rely-
ing on section one as the primary enforcement weapon.2 7 Adherents
to this approach contend that concerted action is the real threat of
oligopoly; therefore, the proper enforcement tactics should be those
traditionally utilized to restrain group conduct.2 1
Controlling oligopoly under section one necessitates additional
attenuation of the conspiracy concept and for that reason is the less
attractive alternative.0 9 Controlling oligopoly under section one
would require a revival and significant expansion of "conscious par-
allelism" as an inferential means of proving an agreement between
the oligopolists. 2 1 The conscious parallelism approach is particu-
larly suspect in the oligopolistic market setting where the recogni-
tion of mutual interdependence is an essential ingredient to the
normal oligopolist's pricing mechanism.2 11 Pushed to its logical con-
clusion, the section one theory of oligopolistic control would ban all
interdependent oligopoly behavior irrespective of the economic and
noneconomic advantages of oligopolistic structure in certain situa-
tions.2 12
The socioeconomic movement away from individualism and the
structural evolution of industry provide a related basis for rejecting
the concerted action approach to oligopoly.213 If the characterization
of the contemporary business relationship as one of "stabilizing
cooperation" and "pluralism '21 4 among individual entrepreneurs is
accurate, no ground for expansion of concerted action remedies is
available under the Sherman Act. To the contrary, any section one
expansion might prove counterproductive to the extent that it
lenged the leaders in the cereal market with the collective possession of monopoly power.
Kellogg Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,898 (1972).
206. Concentrated Industries Act, S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 7320
(1973); see White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy (1968) (the Neal Report),
reprinted in 2 AN'rrrusT L. & ECON. RE v. pt. 2, at 11 (1968).
207. Posner, supra note 202.
208. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
209. See Part IV(A) supra.
210. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); see note 202 supra.
211. For a discussion of the role of interdependence in oligopoly pricing theory, see
SCHERER, supra note 1.
212. The application of a per se rule once the agreement has been proved by conscious
parallelism accentuates this problem. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940).




would not reflect current economic and social values. Therefore,
consideration of the individual conduct and performance of oligo-
polists under section two is more consistent with the competitive
process of advanced capitalism.
Reliance on structure alone, however, is equally suspect. Since
the key to oligopolistic efficiency is the interaction of structure and
conduct, the courts properly can assess performance only after con-
sideration of each. Because existing legal theory treats monopoly
primarily as a structural concept, the attempt to monopolize provi-
sion of section two is a more logical tool for regulating oligopoly.
Moreover, the rule of reason best facilitates the balancing approach
required by the expanded view of attempted monopoly.
In the oligopoly setting, the court should utilize the rule of
reason to analyze both structure and conduct. Market concentration
still would be a relevant factor in attempt analysis, but it would no
longer be the sole or decisive factor. The plaintiff who initially could
not establish the defendant's control of more than fifty percent of
the relevant market would not be summarily dismissed. Instead, the
court would proceed with the structural analysis. It should consider,
for example, the trend of concentration ratios in the industry, giving
particular attention to fringe competition and its effect on the de-
fendant's practices.
The court also should determine the degree of vertical integra-
tion in the industry and in this particular defendant's operation, the
extent of diversification in products and services, and the extent to
which barriers to entry, including significant start-up costs, deter
potential competition. The court should note any supernormal prof-
its in the industry, and it should evaluate the defendant's pricing
power by estimating the price elasticity of demand for the relevant
product. Additionally, the court should take notice of any signifi-
cant externality, including shortages generated from other levels of
the production chain, and it should acknowledge the practical im-
pact of these externalities on performance in the oligopolistic mar-
ket.
Once the plaintiff demonstrates to the court a substantial ad-
verse impact upon competition, the burden should shift to the de-
fendant to justify its performance, guided by the criteria set forth
above. In most cases the defendant has better access to the informa-
tion needed to conduct an exhaustive economic analysis since its
pricing policy helps determine the scope of the market and its cost
data help determine the quality of performance. The rule of reason
also would preserve a de minimis exception to the attempted mo-
1978]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
nopoly violation, thereby shielding the clearly innocent defendant
from the threat of strike suits. For example, when the plaintiff can-
not demonstrate appreciable economic inefficiency through the
structural criteria, and the defendant's particular conduct does not
diverge significantly from the accepted trade norm, the court should
dismiss the suit. Moreover, when the plaintiff carries its initial bur-
den but the defendant justifies its structural position, the court also
should dismiss the claim absent a clear showing of particularly abu-
sive practices.
The conduct criteria are more difficult to articulate. While rela-
tively sound guidelines exist for evaluating predatory pricing, other
types of conduct are not susceptible to quantification. Litigation
delay, fraudulent patent procurement, dealer terminations, refusals
to deal, and disparate product allocation all may constitute abusive
or unfair conduct in one setting and not in another. Consequently,
the court should utilize the flexibility of the rule of reason, taking
into account such factors as the history of antitrust violations, the
vertical relationship between the parties, if any, and any other cir-
cumstances that, although unique to the case, help establish the
defendant's performance. The court should bear in mind as it evalu-
ates conduct the extent to which the defendant's practices conflict
with the noneconomic goals of antitrust, particularly in cases of
marginal structural impact.
VI. CONCLUSION
Attempt to monopolize is an elusive concept. The number of
divergent views demonstrates the complexity the courts face in re-
solving the controversy. The first step toward resolution requires a
rethinking of antitrust values. The many legal tangents have not
produced a satisfactory result primarily because they are formu-
lated on a value base that is incompatible with the functional re-
quirements of the competitive process. While economic efficiency is
a relevant goal of antitrust, it should not be and has not been the
only goal. The evolving socioeconomic structure requires broadly
based antitrust policy that acknowledges economic and noneco-
nomic values and facilitates the transition from competitive indi-
vidualism to a competitive process characterized by stabilization
and cooperation.
Within the broader policy framework, both economic and none-
conomic grounds exist for establishing attempt to monopolize as an
offense independent from the completed offense of monopolization.
Expansion of attempted monopoly would enable the courts to repair
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the presently overworked conspiracy doctrine of section one and to
develop a workable tool for controlling oligopoly. Because criminal
attempt doctrine plays no meaningful role in antitrust analysis, the
courts should discard the traditional formulation of attempted mo-
nopoly in favor of a rule of reason analogous to that employed under
section one. Under the new standard, single-firm conduct and per-
formance would be subject to control under section two, analogous
to the section one prohibition of concerted activity. In keeping with
desirable antitrust policy, the rule of reason should incorporate eco-
nomic analysis, but should not adhere to overly stringent standards
in proof of market power and nearness to actual monopoly. On the
practical level the courts should strike an appropriate balance be-
tween the litigants to encourage hearty litigation of meritorious
claims.
Notwithstanding the inherent conceptual and practical hurdle
of attempt analysis, the foremost obstacle is the consistent refusal
by the Supreme Court to come forth with definitive guidance. The
Court historically has taken a leading role in antitrust development,
and its recent hands-off attitude toward attempted monopoly is
inexplicable. Furthermore, virtually no precedential impediments
exist in the Court's decisions to bar a thorough re-evaluation and
reformulation of attempt standards. The proposed movement to a
rule of reason is in fact consistent with recent antitrust develop-
ments in the Burger Court.215 The Court consistently has moved
away from a per se approach to antitrust enforcement, and the
extreme positions presently advocated by attempt litigants are
polar versions of a per se rule of attempted monopoly. 28 The at-
tempted monopoly question offers a prime opportunity for the Court
to engage in a much-needed reassessment of contemporary values,
to review the demands those values place upon antitrust policy, and
to expand control of single-firm conduct under the Sherman Act.
JOEL RANDALL TEW
215. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
216. While Lessig can be characterized as a per se rule in favor of plaintiffs, see Part
V(C)(1) supra, the dangerous probability approach likewise provides a per se rule in favor
of defendants in attempt claims. See Part V(B) supra.
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